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RESERVATION OF ROYALTY DISTINGUISHED FROM MINERAL
INTEREST
Oklahoma. In Armstrong v. McCracken' the problem of deter-
mining whether the grantors reserved a royalty interest or a min-
eral interest under a conveyance was presented. The reservation
was of an undivided 1/16th interest in and to all oil and gas
"produced" from the conveyed land. The right to lease and to
collect all rentals and bonuses was conveyed to the grantee. The
court held that the reservation was of a 1/16th of gross produc-
tion free of cosfs of operation, emphasizing the fact that the owner
thereof did not have the right to lease, or to bonuses and delay
rentals. The court made a distinction based on phrases because of
the case of Swearingen v. Oldham.' There a reservation of 1/16th
of the oil and gas "in or under" the conveyed tract was retained
in a conveyance which conveyed away the right to lease and to
receive rentals and bonuses. The reservation was held to be of
a mineral interest. In the case of Hinkle v. Gaunt the exception
from the conveyance of a 1/16th interest in oil and gas deposits
read "that might be developed" on the conveyed tract. This was
held to except a mineral interest, thus entitling the owner thereof
to only 1/16th of royalties. But the Hinkle case is not squarely
in point since the problem was to determine whether the interest
was a 1/16th mineral interest or 1/2 mineral interest rather than
to distinguish between a mineral interest and a royalty interest.
The court said in that case, however, that recent mineral deeds
use the phrase "of all oil, gas, and other minerals 'in and under'
the above described land, or that may be 'produced' therefrom."4
This phrasing would destroy the distinction made in Armstrong
v. McCracken.
1----------- Okla -------------- 229 P. 2d 590 (1951).
2 195 Okla. 532, 159 P. 2d 247 (1945).
'201 Okla. 432, 206 P. 2d 1001 (1949).
4 206 P. 2d at 1006.
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In the Texas case of Loefller v. King5 the type of interest con-
veyed while a lease was outstanding was in question. The grant-
ing clause used the words "royalty interest." But the instrument
went on to convey the money rentals, the right to execute future
leases and all interest therein, and the right to bonuses. The court
held the effect of this instrument was to divest the grantor of all
his interest in the minerals and to convey all the mineral estate
that the grantor had in the tract. This result was reached even
though the interest conveyed was labeled a "royalty interest." The
term "royalty" has definite meaning within the oil and gas indus-
try and is not used interchangeably with the term "mineral inter-
est" in Texas.' The court apparently did not consider the label
placed on the interest by the parties to be wholly determinative
as to the nature of the interest and looked to the distribution of
the elements and rights pertaining to a mineral interest between
the parties to determine the nature of the interest conveyed. This
test would seem to be better adapted to ascertaining the intent of
the parties when they have failed clearly to express their intent
than the test applied in Armstrong v. McCracken. This test should
be particularly useful in a state where "royalty interest" may
refer to either a mineral interest or a bare royalty interest.' In
fact, in such a state it is necessary to look to the other elements
in the conveyance or reservation to tell whether the parties in-
tended a mineral interest or a bare royalty interest. A Texas court
has held that when looking to the intent in construing a mineral
deed, the intent which controls is not that which the parties may
have had, but failed to express, but the intention which by instru-
ment they did express.'
5 -..........Tex........... ,236 S. W. 2d 772 (1951).
6 Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 101 S. W. 2d 543 (1937).
Melton v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 109 P. 2d 509 (1940).
s Loeffler v. King, 228 S. W. 2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), ree'd ........... Tex-..
236 S. W. 2d 772 (1951).
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PAYMENT OF DELAY RENTALS UNDER THE "UNLESS" TYPE LEASE
Texas. A recent Texas case has emphasized the problems in-
volved in the payment of delay rentals under an "unless" type
lease. In Superior Oil Co. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.9 the assignee
of a lessee failed to make a timely delay rental payment and lost
the lease. The lease form used was described as "C-88 R-Pro-
ducers' 88 Special-Texas Form." The pertinent clause read as
follows:
If no well be commenced on said land on or before . . . [date],
this lease shall terminate... , unless the lessee on or before that date
shall pay or tender to the lessor.., the sum of ... [amount], which
shall operate as rental and cover the privilege of deferring the com-
mencement of a well for twelve (12) months, from said date. In
like manner and upon like payments or tenders the commencement
of a well may be further deferred for like periods of the same num-
ber of months successively. ...
Should the first well drilled on the above described land be a
dry hole, then and in that event, if a second well is not commenced
on said land within twelve months thereafter, this lease shall termi-
nate as to both parties, unless the lessee on or before the expiration
of said twelve months shall resume the payment of rentals in the
same amount and in the same manner as hereinbefore provided....
[On resumption] the last preceding paragraph hereof, shall con-
tinue in force just as though there had been no interruption in the
rental payments.' 0
The court held that the provisions of these two clauses when read
together created an ambiguity as to the date on which the delay
rentals were to be paid in the event a dry hole was drilled on this
leasehold. The lessee's assignee made a proper tender of the
rental money under the delay rental clause of the lease, but the
tender was too late under the construction of the two clauses made
by his assignor and the lessor. They had resolved the ambiguous
terms so as to effect a change in the rental payment date on the
completion of a dry hole, to the anniversary of the dry hole. This
construction bound the assignee since the lease was held to be
S-----...--- Tex ... -, 240 S. W . 2d 281 (1951).
10 240 S. W. 2d at 283.
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ambiguous, and the lease automatically terminated. A like result
was reached in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Mullican," where
a correction instrument was held to be ambiguous as to whether
the delay rental date was to follow the date in the correction in-
strument or the date in the original lease. Although the correction
lease was expressly stated to be in lieu of the old lease, the court
held the instrument ambiguous and found the intent of the orig-
inal parties to be for the original date to control. The lease termi-
nated as to an assignee when he paid rentals under the correction
instrument date. Under these well established principles-that an
"'unless" lease is a limitation and not a forfeiture,12 that the lease
must be strictly construed against the lessee, 8 and that since the
purpose of the lease is oil and gas development," time is of the
essence in oil and gas leases' 5-the lessee has little remedy except
his own extreme care in the making of rental payments and in the
,drafting of leases.
The exception to automatic termination for a defective rental
payment is where the payee has in some manner been the cause
of the mistake or misconstruction. Though the courts have indi-
cated (but not expressly) that fault on the part of the payee will
be found in extremely inequitable situations," it seems that the
exception is very limited.
When the defect in the payment is due to the actions of the trans-
mitting agency and the transmitting agency has notice of the neces.
sity for speed to avoid the loss of the lease, the lessee was ac-
corded some relief in a recent Oklahoma case. 7 Though the lease
11 144 Tex. 609, 192 S. W. 2d 770 (1946).
12 2 SuMmErs, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (Perm. Ed. 1938) 230.
is Zeppa v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 113 S. W. 2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938)er.
rej.; see Note, 14 A. L. R. 967 (1921).
14 Texas Co. v. Davis, 113 Tex. 321, 254 S. W. 304, 255 S. W. 601 (1923).
11 31A TEx. Jun., Oil and Gas, § 154, p. 265.
16 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S. W. 2d 355 (1947).
17 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Jordan Petroleum Co . _Okla_ .--.- 238 P. 2d
B20 (1951).
